Crisis and methodology: some heterodox misunderstandings by Kakarot-Handtke, Egmont
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Crisis and methodology: some heterodox
misunderstandings
Egmont Kakarot-Handtke
University of Stuttgart, Institute of Economics and Law
13 June 2012
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/43260/
MPRA Paper No. 43260, posted 14 December 2012 05:26 UTC
Crisis and Methodology: Some Heterodox
Misunderstandings
Egmont Kakarot-Handtke∗
Abstract
Whether justified by the concrete circumstances or not, an economic crisis
is, by simple association, taken as an implicit refutation of the invisible hand
vision and the underlying theory. The fundamental heterodox critique locates
the source of apparent theoretical difficulties at the level of methodology.
Although acceptable in principle, this belief involves some actual misun-
derstandings with regard to the respective roles of deterministic laws and
deductive reasoning. In order to clarify these, the present paper revisits some
key episodes in the history of economic methodology.
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One positive consequence of the ongoing economic crisis is that the
intellectual malaise of the modern academic discipline of economics
is becoming ever more widely recognised. . . . It is . . . not at all
surprising that mainstream contributions are found continually to be so
unrealistic and explanatorily limited. The (mathematical) method, or
rather the emphasis placed upon it in the modern economics academy,
is the overriding problem. (Lawson, 2012, p. 3), original emphasis
Those who have lost their job, their money, or their home in the latest financial
crisis and its aftermath will be surprised to learn that their misfortune is ultimately
caused by methodological problems of academic economics. This attribution seems
bizarre. Yet, on second thought, it resonates well with Keynes’s closing sentence in
the General Theory about the power of ideas: ‘. . . it is ideas, not vested interests,
which are dangerous for good or evil’ (1973, p. 384). If it is ideas that ultimately
rule the world this must hold with extra force for the methodological ideas that
inform scientific research.
When economists daydream they fancy that practical men are the intellectual
‘slaves of some defunct economist’ (Keynes, 1973, p. 383). Let us face the facts.
Late in life, moreover, he [Napoleon] claimed that he had always
believed that if an empire were made of granite the ideas of economists,
if listened to, would suffice to reduce it to dust. (Viner, 1963, p. 1)
The more intelligent part of practical men has an instrumental relation to ideas and
takes whatever suits best in the given circumstances to advance their cause. This
should not come as a surprise. A natural preference for doxa instead of episteme
is implied in Adam Smith’s vision of the self-interested agent. If they cared for
one, practical men have – given the dubious methodological status of economics –
always found the congenial academic underpinning for their agenda.
However, these practical contributions of economists for the most part
did not require any great scientific apparatus. The argument that “the
market works” has been known for many centuries, even before Adam
Smith. It often amounts to little more than saying that a money system
with prices for goods and services will outperform a barter system as an
arrangement for their exchange – something recognized by all kinds of
societies and stated in many times and places before modern “technical”
economics. (Nelson, 2006, pp. 330-331)
A priori, an alliance of economics and politics does not prove anything for or against
a specific approach and may sometimes even come as a surprise to the theoreticians
themselves.
I have always regarded Competitive General Equilibrium analysis as
akin to the mock-up an aircraft engineer might build. My amazement
in recent years has accordingly been very great to find that many
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economists are passing the mock-up off as an airworthy plane, and
that politicians, bankers, and commentators are scrambling to get seats.
This at a time when theorists all over the world have become aware
that anything based on this mock-up is unlikely to fly, since it neglects
some crucial aspects of the world, the recognition of which will force
some drastic re-designing. (Hahn, 1981, p. 1036)
According to Hahn’s testimonial the real world application of the apex of math-
ematical economics and the core of standard economics is, if anything, a proof
for the power of misapprehension. The fact that existent theoretical economics
is sometimes taken seriously by politicians, central bankers, business people and
economists themselves is not a proof of its validity but rather of a widespread naïvité
(cf. Stiglitz, 2011).
Lawson’s nexus between economic crisis and methodology boils down to a
bidirectional causal chain: the latest economic crisis is attributed to orthodox
theory; this theory is the achievement of a wrong methodology. In reverse causality
this suggests that the abandonment of the mathematical method, the hallmark of
orthodoxy, will lead to a better theoretical understanding of how the economy works
and eventually to the prevention of crises. Although not illogical, this belief involves
subtle misunderstandings. In order to clarify these it is illuminating to revisit some
key episodes in the checkered history of economic methodology.
1 The elements of economic methodology
In the era of political economy, economists actively participated in the grand project
of the advance of knowledge.
I am inclined to say even more: from Plato to Descartes, Leibniz, Kant,
Duhem and Poincaré; and from Bacon, Hobbes, and Locke, to Hume,
Mill, and Russel, the theory of knowledge was inspired by the hope that
it would enable us not only to know more about knowledge, but also to
contribute to the advance of knowledge – of scientific knowledge, that
is. (Popper, 1980, p. 19)
It was rather commonplace that a physicist, e.g. Mach, or a mathematician, e.g.
Poincaré, quoted J. S. Mill on matters of methodology.1 Mill expressly advocated
borrowing from physics. This, though, involved two essentially different elements.
First, the idea of deterministic causal laws.
The backward state of the Moral Sciences can only be remedied by
applying to them the methods of Physical Science, duly extended and
generalized. (Mill, 2006b, p. 833)
1 “One text he [Dirac] took out of the library was John Stuart Mill’s A System of Logic, which the
young Einstein had studied some fifteen years before. . . . He [Mill] influenced Dirac, and many
others, more than they knew.” (Farmelo, 2009, p. 43)
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Second, the deductive method.
In the definition which we have attempted to frame of the science of
Political Economy, we have characterized it as essentially an abstract
science, and its method as the method à priori. Such is undoubtedly
its character as it has been understood and taught by all its most dis-
tinguished teachers. It reasons, and, as we contend, must necessarily
reason, from assumptions, not from facts. It is built upon hypotheses,
strictly analogous to those which, under the name of definitions, are the
foundations of other abstract sciences. (Mill, 2004, p. 110), original
emphasis
Mill was explicit about the subsidiary role of the deductive method.
The ground of confidence in any concrete deductive science is not the à
priori reasoning itself, but the accordance between its results and those
of observation à posteriori. (Mill, 2006b, p. 896-897)
It was rather obvious to Mill that deterministic causal laws and human behavior do
not match.
The phenomena with which this science [of human nature] is conversant
being the thoughts, feelings, and actions of human beings, it would
have attained the ideal perfection of a science if it enabled us to foretell
how an individual would think, feel, or act, throughout life, with the
same certainty with which astronomy enables us to predict the places
and occultations of the heavenly bodies. It needs scarcely be stated that
nothing approaching to this can be done. (Mill, 2006b, p. 846)
To get economics off the ground as a science and to demarcate it from psychology
and sociology made it imperative to say something general about human behavior
in the economic realm. Mill put it thus:
Just in the same manner [as geometry] does Political Economy pre-
suppose an arbitrary definition of man, as a being who invariably does
that by which he may obtain the greatest amount of necessaries, conve-
niences, and luxuries, with the smallest quantity of labour and physical
self-denial with which they can be obtained in the existing state of
knowledge. (Mill, 2004, p. 110)
Mill regarded this proposition as an empirical law which resembles, but has to be
carefully distinguished from, universal deterministic physical laws. Empirical laws
are neither deterministic nor universal, they express merely a local and temporary
tendency.
In political economy for instance, empirical laws of human nature
are tacitly assumed by English thinkers, which are calculated only for
Great Britain and the United States. (Mill, 2006b, p. 906)
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Mill identified deterministic laws and deductive reasoning as the two crucial el-
ements of the scientific method and adapted them to economics. With regard to
a sufficiently articulated theory the first element implies the criterion of material
consistency, the second of logical consistency. A theory must satisfy both criteria,
that is to say, it can be rejected either on empirical or on logical grounds alone.
Mill realized that human behavior is not subject to deterministic laws but, if at
all, to the weaker form of empirical laws. A detailed analysis of human behavior,
though, was not the topmost issue for the classicals. It was the laws of price
formation, growth and distribution they were really interested in.
2 Law and logic
The conception of a deterministic causal law had been made abundantly clear by
Newton. His approach became paradigmatic among economists (Redman, 1997, pp.
208-218) and gave rise to an inflation of laws beginning with the laws of demand
and supply and ending with the laws of motion of the society as a whole.
But it was a second and more important quality that struck readers
of the Principia. At the head of Book I stand the famous Axioms, or
the Laws of motion: . . . For readers of that day, it was this deductive,
mathematical aspect that was the great achievement. (Truesdell, quoted
in Schmiechen, 2009, p. 213)
While J. S. Mill derived his behavioral tendencies inductively, Jevons choose a
systematic approach to impose order upon the arbitrary multitude of laws.
The science of Economics, however, is in some degree peculiar, owing
to the fact ... that its ultimate laws are known to us immediately by
intuition, or, at any rate, they are furnished to us ready made by other
mental or physical sciences. That every person will choose the greater
apparent good; that human wants are more or less quickly satiated;
that prolonged labor becomes more and more painful; are a few of
the simple inductions on which we can proceed to reason deductively
with great confidence. From these axioms we can deduce the laws of
supply and demand, the laws of that difficult conception, value, and all
the intricate results of commerce, so far as data are available. (Jevons,
1911, p. 18)
Just like Mill, Jevons applied the deductive method. But there is a subtle shift of
meaning. When Jevons uses the term law he has the deterministic laws of Newton
at the back of his mind and not the empirical laws of Mill. Jevons accorded his
fundamental behavioral law the logical status of an axiom.
... the theory here given may be described as the mechanics of utility
and self-interest. Oversights may have been committed in tracing out
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its details, but in its main features this theory must be the true one. Its
method is as sure and demonstrative as that of kinematics or statics,
nay, almost as self-evident as are the elements of Euclid, when the real
meaning of the formulæ is fully seized. (Jevons, 1911, p. 21)
His program was from outer appearances the same as Mill’s but Jevons went one
decisive step further.
An explicit maximization hypothesis has been the hallmark of neoclas-
sical economic since the end of the nineteenth century and might easily
be seen to be the one major departure that distinguishes neoclassical
from classical economics. (Boland, 2003, p. 49)
This established marginalism as the explanatory device from consumer choice to
production and distribution.
These economists were implicitly treating microeconomics as a pure
axiomatic system, whose terms may or may not be instantiated in the
real world, but which is of great interest, like Euclidean geometry,
whether or not its objects actually exist. (Rosenberg, 1994, p. 229)
The crucial point of Jevons’s approach, which culminated in the existence proof
of general equilibrium (Weintraub, 1985), are the premises. To recall, Newton’s
set of axioms contained the deterministic laws of motion. Because these have a
counterpart in the real world the deductive method provides conclusions that are
potentially in agreement with observation. This cannot happen if the terms in
the axioms have no real world interpretation. In this case, the criterion of logical
consistency is satisfied but that of material consistency is inapplicable and therefore
undecidable. Keynes clearly identified the salient methodological point.
For if orthodox economics is at fault, the error is to be found not in
the superstructure, which has been erected with great care for logical
consistency, but in a lack of clearness and of generality in the premises.
(Keynes, 1973, p. xxi)
3 The return of Common Sense
To make the world we live in understandable to ourselves we have not only myth
and science but also common sense – uneasily sitting between the two. J. S. Mill
had no friendly word for common sense.
People fancied they saw the sun rise and set, the stars revolve in circles
round the pole. We now know that they saw no such thing; what they
really saw was a set of appearances, equally reconcileable with the
theory they held and with a totally different one. It seems strange
that such an instance as this, . . . , should not have opened the eyes of
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the bigots of common sense, and inspired them with a more modest
distrust of the competency of mere ignorance to judge the conclusions
of cultivated thought. (Mill, 2006b, p. 783), original emphasis
Apart from being presumptuous, common sense is simply not up to the task.
But, as beings of limited experience, we must always and necessarily
have limited conceptive powers; while it does not by any means follow
that the same limitations obtain in the possibilities of nature, nor even
in her actual manifestations. (Mill, 2006b, p. 753)
Keynes thought otherwise. He was acquainted with Quine’s argument that theoreti-
cal simplification is achieved through formalization but held that this did not apply
to the social realm.
Between the alternatives of metaphorical jouissance and an austere
canonical notation there is a middle route, and its viability has been
argued for, and displayed by Keynes. (Coates, 2007, p. 87)
Before starting work on the General Theory, Keynes had made up his mind.
In the early thirties he confessed to Roy Harrod that he was “returning
to an age-long tradition of common sense.” (Coates, 2007, p. 11), see
also (Skidelsky, 2009, p. 82)
Now, economics deals not only with individuals and social relations but the eco-
nomic system as a whole and Keynes had to come to grips with ‘definitions and
ideas’. In fact, he did not. He spent an immense amount of his time on Book II ‘and
still left his successors in confusion’ (Moggridge, 1976, p. 33).
By choosing definitions on the ground that they correspond with actual
usage Keynes was formulating an ordinary language social science,
one that bears a resemblance to those argued for by philosophers of
hermeneutics. (Coates, 2007, p. 90)
To recall, Newton first defined his basic concepts mass and force by giving them a
precise meaning that was quite different from the woolly everyday usage. In marked
contrast, Keynes related his definition of income expressly to ‘the practices of the
Income Tax Commissioners’. He was in grave doubt whether “it might be better
to employ the term windfalls for what I call profits”. But he was quite sure that
“saving and investment are, necessarily and by definition, equal – which after all, is
in full harmony with common sense and the common usage of the world.” (Keynes,
quoted in Coates, 2007, pp. 93, 91, original emphasis)
Keynes had no clear idea of the fundamental economic concepts income and
profit, and he knew it.
His Collected Writings show that he wrestled to solve the Profit Puzzle
up till the semi-final versions of his GT but in the end he gave up and
discarded the draft chapter dealing with it. (Tómasson and Bezemer,
2010, pp. 12-13, 16)
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In the discussions following the publication of the General Theory Keynes had ‘no
desire’ that the particular forms of his ‘comparatively simple fundamental ideas . . .
should be crystallized at the present state of the debate’ (cited in Rotheim, 1981,
p. 571). Keynes kept the discussion within the compass of common sense, where
‘nothing is clear and everything is possible’ (Keynes, 1973, p. 292).
With his middle route Keynes followed the philosophically well-established
Cambridge tradition of loose verbal reasoning.
Another danger is that you may ‘precise everything away’ and be left
with only a comparative poverty of meaning. . . . Such a problem
was avoided, said Keynes, by Marshall who used loose definitions but
allowed the reader to infer his meaning from “the richness of context.”
(Coates, 2007, p. 87)
But, again, common sense, legitimized by its descent from the Scottish School of
common sense and euphemized as vigilant observation and intuition, was not up to
the task.
Looking back over the last 70 years it is an inescapable fact that the
theoretical arm of the Keynesian Revolution never got off the ground.
(Rogers, 2010, p. 152)
The Cambridge tradition, continual frustration notwithstanding, still has its episte-
mological adherents.
For Keynes as for Post Keynesians the guiding motto is "it is better to
be roughly right than precisely wrong!" (Davidson, 1984, p. 574)
If we define the ambition of science as to get it precisely right then the guiding motto
of Post Keynesianism amounts to an invitation of ‘Babylonian incoherent babble’
(cf. Dow, 2005, p. 385) and leads, predictably, to a loss of theoretical coherence
(King, 2002, pp. 203-208). Confronted with the phony alternative relevance vs.
rigor or truth vs. precision (Mayer, 1993) the non-Keynesians opted for rigor.
Mathematical economics, it seems, had the great virtue of demonstra-
ble irrelevance, which was morally preferable to spurious relevance.
(Porter, 1994, p. 155)
4 Weirdness, realism, formalization
Since Keynes’s days common sense came steadily more under pressure with the
escalation of weirdness in the natural sciences and mathematics.
. . . the fundamental problem in philosophy of science – making sense
of and determining how science has arrived in a justified way at its
present, extremely weird, beliefs about how the world is. . . . Thales
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and Aristotele could not have arrived at quantum theory; no naive
examination of experience could have suggested such a view of the
world. (Suppe, 1977, p. 684), original emphasis
This opened a welcome chance to defend all kinds of weird concepts with fresh
panache. Had not Newton introduced the occult force of gravitation, and had not
Galileo assumed a nonexistent vacuum? This became the first line of defense against
the critique of unrealism in economics.
The most important methodological issue in economics has been and
persists to be over what is called the ‘realism’ of theories and their ‘as-
sumptions’. Profit maximization, perfect information, transitive prefer-
ences, diminishing returns, rational expectations, perfectly competitive
markets, givenness of tastes, technology and institutional framework,
non-gendered agents – these and many other ideas have been assumed
by some economists and questioned by others. (Mäki, 1994, p. 236)
There are, though, two kinds of weirdness: justified and unjustified. The first
thing to notice is that physical weirdness occurs on very small or very large scales
(Feynman, 1992, p. 127). Second, Newton could not, in the strict sense, explain
gravitation but he could express it in a neat formula. The calculations that were
performed with it proved to be quite accurately in correspondence with facts.
The second line of defense appeals rhetorically to common sense.
But can the model be true? Can any model be true? I do not think so.
Any model, whether in physics or in the social sciences, must be be an
over-simplification. (Popper, 1994, p. 172)
Indeed, who could ever deny this truism? The map is not the landscape. The point
is that Newton knew how to properly over-simplify (Cohen, 1999, pp. 148-155) and
thereby to gain real insights while his imitators in the social sciences did not.
In economics the conceptual primitives are humans, middle-sized objects, mea-
surable variables like prices, and in most cases trivial events like buying and selling
which involve rather down-to-earth human faculties. That is, the economic realm
is coextensive with the physical realm that has been satisfactorily explained by
classical mechanics. Physics has to be taken seriously as a boundary condition.
Political Economy, therefore, presupposes all the physical sciences; it
takes for granted all such of the truths of those sciences as are concerned
in the production of the objects demanded by the wants of mankind; . . .
(Mill, 2004, p. 102)
Yet classical mechanics is not weird at all. It is alone economic theory that is weird,
as Walras learned to his chagrin.
Walras approached Poincaré for his approval. . . . But Poincaré was
devoutly committed to applied mathematics and did not fail to notice
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that utility is a nonmeasurable magnitude. . . . He also wondered about
the premises of Walras’s mathematics: It might be reasonable, as a
first approximation, to regard men as completely self-interested, but
the assumption of perfect foreknowledge “perhaps requires a certain
reserve.” (Porter, 1994, p. 154)
By the same token is Keynes’s uncertainty argument perfectly justified.
The sense in which I am using the term [uncertainty] is that in which
the prospect of a European war is uncertain, or the price of copper and
the rate of interest twenty years hence, or the obsolescence of a new
invention . . . About these matters there is no scientific basis on which
to form any calculable probability whatever. We simply do not know.
(Keynes, 1937, p. 214)
Compared to the weirdness of assumptions like foreknowledge Keynes’s return to
justified common sense must therefore be counted as theoretical progress, notwith-
standing the fact that it brings us only back to from where Socrates started, i.e. to ‘I
know that I know nothing.’
The problem is . . . that the assumptions made in economic theories
and models simply are unrealistic in the wrong way and for the wrong
reasons. (Pålsson Syll, 2010, p. 26)
Physicists do not reject unrealistic abstractions and idealizations as long as they do
not distort the object of inquiry beyond recognition, yet there is perfect unanimity
that, for example, an ideal construct like a perpetual motion machine is impossible
in principle and not merely infeasible in practice. What Keynes called the ‘classical’
theory is the economic counterpart of a perpetual motion machine. To spell this out
made the General Theory a conversation-stopper. And it still is. Keynes’s scientific
stance is consensus among methodologists.
A scientific theory cannot require the facts to conform to its own
assumptions. (Keynes, 1973, p. 276)
This is in full accordance with the classical stance.
Such thinkers do not reflect that the idea, being a result of abstraction,
ought to conform to the facts, and cannot make the facts conform to it.
(Mill, 2006b, p. 751)
Realism led Keynes to the conclusion that the ‘classics’, i.e. the British neoclassical
school, stood on the wrong side of the line that demarcates science from nonscience
but he could not offer an in all respects superior alternative. With regard to weird
behavioral assumptions common sense points the way to the right side of the
demarcation line. To follow it, however, is beyond common sense.
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. . . Keynes, too, sometimes gave the impression of not having fully
grasped the logic of his own system. (Laidler, 1999, p. 281)
Keynes famously announced his revolution with a reference to Euclid.
Yet, in truth, there is no remedy except to throw over the axiom of
parallels and to work out a non-Euclidean geometry. Something similar
is required to-day in economics. (Keynes, 1973, p. 16)
This in turn would have required some sort of non-Euclidean axioms, that is, a bit
more formalization than Keynes was prepared to do himself.
I mean by this that formalization eliminates provincial and inessential
features of the way in which a scientific theory has been thought about.
. . . Formalization is a way of setting off from the forest of implicit
assumptions and the surrounding thickness of confusion, the ground
that is required for the theory being considered. . . . In areas of science
where great controversy exists about even the most elementary concepts,
the value of such formalization can be substantial. (Suppes, 1968, pp.
654-655)
5 Heterodox disarray
The main ‘culprit’, I shall argue is a mode of explanation that can be
referred to as deductivist, or, more particularly, it is the conception of
‘laws’ (or ‘significant results’ or ‘theoretical formulations’) upon which
deductivist explanation ultimately depends. (Lawson, 1997, p. 16),
original emphasis
Is deductivist the same thing as deductive, i.e. ‘the process of reasoning from one
or more general statements . . . to reach a logically certain conclusion’ (Wikipedia:
Deductive reasoning)? Obviously not.
By deductivism I simply mean the collection of theories . . . that is
erected upon the event regularity conception of laws . . . . (Lawson,
1997, p. 17)
Now, the conception of a law implies a deterministic event regularity in the causal
form ‘if event X then event Y.’ This, though, is quite different from the deductive
form which states ‘if antecedent X then consequent Y.’ This form has nothing to do
with deterministic causal laws.
. . . deductive chains of reasoning cannot on their own establish the
existence of causal processes in the real world. (Hodgson, 2001, p. 76)
Yet the two are closely interrelated in physics.
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To give a causal explanation of an event means to deduce a statement
which describes it, using as premises of the deduction one or more
universal laws, together with certain singular statements, the initial
conditions. (Popper, 1980, p. 59), original emphasis
The key point is that universal laws are taken as premises. Deduction is applied
in physics too, but physic’s hallmark are deterministic laws while mathematics is
purely deductive.
It is a well-known jest that ‘a mathematician is a scientist who knows
neither what he is talking about nor whether whatever he is talking
about exists or not’. (Cartan, quoted in Ronan, 2006, p. 70)
Nobody has ever criticized mathematicians for being “deductivist”. Quite the
contrary, the plain fact that products of pure deductive reasoning correspond in
numerous cases admirably to the objects and processes of reality has puzzled
physicists, philosophers, and the mathematicians themselves since the ancient
Greeks.
It is the idea of an event regularity in the form of a law that has been identified
by Lawson as main culprit. Hence “determinist” instead of “deductivist” would have
been a less ambiguous characteristics. The deductive method does not necessarily
imply deterministic laws that enable prediction in the social realm. This is known
since J. S. Mill.
It is evident, in the first place, that Sociology, considered as a system
of deductions à priori, cannot be a science of positive predictions, but
only of tendencies. (Mill, 2006b, p. 898)
Positive prediction would only be possible if the premises were universal determin-
istic laws.
If the conditions of the theory are satisfied, the events that it predicts
will necessarily take place. This inevitability of the analysis accords it
a considerable prognostic significance, according to Robbins. Seldom
has a simple view of a matter found so much support as the apriorism
that he professed, which John Stuart Mill . . . developed for the first time
under the name ‘concrete deduction’ as a variant of the hypothetico-
deductive model of physics. (Klant, 1994, p. 25)
The salient point is easy to see. Robbins presupposed the existence of universal
deterministic behavioral laws. This, evidently, has nothing to do with the deduc-
tive method. What Lawson criticizes under the label “deductivist” is Robbins’s
misapplication. At first it seems that Lawson got the point.
Certainly, any application of the retroductive . . . form of reasoning
requires an explicit prior statement of the premises which are used to
initiate the analysis. Nor, of course, is deduction per se ruled out in the
latter, or in any other general approach to reasoning. (Lawson, 1997, p.
112)
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But in the next sentence he equates “deductivist” with what in fact is “determinist”.
The employment of deductive logic, where it is appropriate, is not
accepting the deductivist form of analysis (whereby the object always
is to deduce specific claims about actualities from accepted ‘laws’
and initial conditions, possibly including its axioms and assumptions).
(Lawson, 1997, p. 112)
This means in more concrete terms.
The essence of neoclassical economic theory is its exclusive use of a de-
ductivist Euclidean methodology. A methodology – which Arnsperger
& Varoufakis calls the neoclassical meta-axioms of “methodological
individualism, methodological instrumentalism and methodological
equilibration” – that is more or less imposed as constituting economics,
and, usually, without a smack of argument. (Pålsson Syll, 2010, p. 24)
We are no longer occupied with the deductive method pure and simple as conceived
by Mill. So this is what is at issue: (a) the deductive method is mistaken, or
(b), there is nothing wrong with the method but the neoclassical meta-axioms and
deterministic behavioral laws are beside the point.
And here is where the flimsy logic of the critics of the neoclassical approach
comes in. From the widely accepted fact that neoclassical economics is unsatisfac-
tory and the correct observation that it applies the deductive method and produces
an abundance of vacuous mathematical models the conclusion is drawn that the
method is wrong. The simple fact is – as already noticed by Poincaré – that the
foundational assumptions of neoclassical economics are inadmissible. Hence the
correct conclusion is to reject the meta-axioms and to keep hold of the deductive
method because it is neutral with regard to premises. With false premises it yields
the false conclusion and vice versa with true premises. It is as straightforward as
‘garbage in, garbage out’. What is needed are true premises.
Each theory (heterodox approaches are no exception) starts from ‘hypotheses or
axioms or postulates or assumptions or even principles’ (Schumpeter, 1994, p. 15).
Therefore, the crucial question is:
What are the propositions which may reasonably be received without
proof? That there must be some such propositions all are agreed, since
there cannot be an infinite series of proof, a chain suspended from
nothing. (Mill, 2006a, p. 746)
No theory whatever can dodge this question. Emphasizing that neoclassical eco-
nomics is unconvincing is neither new nor helpful. Mathematics as pure deduction
is not the problem either. It allows us to express the wrong idea that the planets
move in circles or the right idea that they move in ellipses. By the same token it
allows us to express the wrong idea that the economy is a deterministic equilibrium
system and the right idea that it is a nondeterministic open system. Now, take the
mathematics away and what is left?
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To Plato’s question, “Granted that there are means of reasoning
from premises to conclusions, who has the privilege of choosing the
premises?” the correct answer, I presume, is that anyone has this privi-
lege who wishes to exercise it, but that everyone else has the privilege
of deciding for himself what significance to attach to the conclusions,
and that somewhere there lies the responsibility, through the choice of
the appropriate premises, to see to it that judgment, information, and
perhaps even faith, hope and charity, wield their due influence on the
nature of economic thought. (Viner, 1963, p. 12)
This is a fair appraisal of the deductive method. What could be the objections
against it? No methodologist ever maintained that it automatically produces ‘true’
theories. This may appear as a serious drawback, but neither exaggerated claims
nor disappointed expectations provide a valid argument against the method.
The gist of the whole matter is: by rightly sticking to the deductive method
yet applying indefensible premises neoclassical economics discredited the method
in the eyes of critics. This would be a minor casualty were it not for the fact that
by rejecting the method heterodoxy deprives itself of one of the most elementary
scientific tools to build up a serious theoretical alternative.
. . . we may say that the long-lasting success of our categories and the
omnipresence of a certain point of view is not a sign of excellence or an
indication that the truth or part of the truth has at last been found. It is,
rather, the indication of a failure of reason to find suitable alternatives
which might be used to transcend an accidental intermediate stage of
our knowledge. (Feyerabend, 2004, p. 72), original emphasis
6 Deduction vs. intuition: a phony trade-off
A purely deductive method would ensure us that conclusions were as
probative as the premises on which they build. But deduction is totally
unampliative. Its output is in its truth-transmitting input. If we are to
use content-increasing methods we therefore have to accept that they
can’t be of a deductive caliber. (Pålsson Syll, 2010, p. 48)
Indeed, but this is the very strength of the method and not a lamentable weakness.
Two points are essential: to state the premises explicitly and then to develop the
logical implications without tacitly changing the premises on the way and without
introducing additional premises. If there is truth in the premises it is conserved,
nothing is added and nothing is lost. The method ensures formal consistency, not
more, not less.
Research is in fact a continuous discussion of the consistency of theo-
ries: formal consistency insofar as the discussion relates to the logical
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cohesion of what is asserted in joint theories; material consistency
insofar as the agreement of observations with theories is concerned.
(Klant, 1994, p. 31)
Formal consistency, of course, is not all but it is a necessary condition ‘for he who
contradicts himself proves nothing’ (Klant, 1988, pp. 112-113).
By its very nature the deductive method must not be content-increasing. The
content resides in the premises. Hence the choice of premises is decisive. This
choice, though, is antecedent to the application of the deductive method. This is
long known from the history of science.
Popper demonstrates that “logic, whether deductive or inductive, cannot
possibly make the step from these theories [of Galileo and Kepler] to
Newton’s dynamics. It is only ingenuity which can make this step.”
(Cohen, 1977, p. 335)
In a similar way Einstein speaks of the ‘search for those highly universal
laws . . . from which a picture of the world can be obtained by pure
deduction. There is no logical path’, he says, ‘leading to these . . . laws.
They can only be reached by intuition, based upon something like an
intellectual love (‘Einfühlung’) of the objects of experience. (Popper,
1980, p. 32)
And yet, by three incorrect steps . . . , Kepler stumbled on the correct
law. It is perhaps the most amazing sleepwalking performance in the
history of science . . . (Koestler, 1979, p. 333)
The pivot of any scientific inquiry is – once more:
What are the propositions which may reasonably be received without
proof? That there must be some such propositions all are agreed, since
there cannot be an infinite series of proof, a chain suspended from
nothing. But to determine what these propositions are, is the opus
magnum of the more recondite mental philosophy. (Mill, 2006a, p.
746), original emphasis
Deduction does not prevent intuition, it rather presupposes the opus magnum of
intuition.
7 Refocusing the domain
In fact, the history of every science, including that of economics,
teaches us that the elementary is the hotbed of the errors that count
most. (Georgescu-Roegen, 1970, p. 9)
This brings us to the very question of what the elementary in the infinite multitude
of economic phenomena is.
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Thus, economics is apparently the study of the economy, the study of
the coordination process, the study of the effects of scarcity, the science
of choice, and the study of human behavior. One possible conclusion
to draw from this lack of agreement is that the definition of economics
does not really matter. (Backhouse and Medema, 2009, p. 221)
The task of theoretical economics is to create a mental map of the whole economy
without firsthand experience.
And in the social sciences it is even more obvious than in the natural
sciences that we cannot see and observe our objects before we have
thought about them. For most of the objects of social science, if not
all of them, are abstract objects; they are theoretical constructions.
(Popper, 1960, p. 135), original emphasis
That is, one has to leap from commonplace economics which trades in easy to grasp
phenomena on a small scale to an extremely abstract set of foundational propositions
about the economy as a whole.
Since, therefore, it is vain to hope that truth can be arrived at, either
in Political Economy or in any other department of the social science,
while we look at the facts in the concrete, clothed in all the complexity
with which nature has surrounded them, and endeavor to elicit a general
law by a process of induction from a comparison of details; there
remains no other method than the à priori one, or that of “abstract
speculation.” (Mill, 2004, p. 113-114)
The set of basic propositions has to reduce the vast complexity of the real thing to
almost nothing. From this almost-nothingness the real world complexity then has
to be logically reconstructed. The first task is to clarify the domain of the inquiry
which is neither well-defined nor arbitrary.
Scientific domains are characterized as a number if items of information
(putative facts, including, perhaps, accepted laws and theories) which
come to be associated together as a body of information having the fol-
lowing characteristics: the association is based on some well-grounded,
significant, relationship between the items of information which are
suggestive of deeper unities among the items; . . . (Suppe, 1977, p.
686), original emphasis
The clarifying of the domain involves a tentative decision of what to take in and what
to leave out. For example: the trajectories of a feather and a canon ball both belong
to the physical realm. Being too complex the physicists ignored the flying feather
and focused on the falling canon ball. In this manner most real world phenomena
drop out of the domain – at least for the time being. One has no guarantee that this
abstraction from supposedly insignificant phenomena will work or whether one gets
hold of the significant relationships. Here is where intuition and skill come in.
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The more complicated the model and the greater the number of the
variables involved, the further it moves beyond our mental control,
which in social sciences is the only possible control. ... A “simple-
minded” model may after all be the more enlightening representation
of the economic process provided that the economist has developed his
skill to the point of being able to pick up a few but significant elements
from the multitude of cluttering facts. The choice of relevant facts is
the main problem of any science, as Poincaré and Bridgman insisted.
(Georgescu-Roegen, 1971, pp. 340-341)
For the purposes of theoretical economics real human beings have been reduced to
homo oeconomicus.
No science has been criticized by its own servants as openly and
constantly as economics. The motives of dissatisfaction are many,
but the most important pertains to the fiction of homo oeconomicus.
(Georgescu-Roegen, 1971, p. 1)
Since homo oeconomicus is patently alien there was an almost instinctive call for
more realism. Commonsensical as it is, this conclusion jumps too short. The fact
that human beings belong to the economic realm does not automatically imply that
they belong to the domain of economics or that they have to occupy a larger part of it.
In classical economics the main issues were accumulation, innovation, competition,
productivity, distribution of income and wealth etcetera. Homo oeconomicus was,
if anything, a side-show. The real humans belonged to the domains of psychology,
anthropology, sociology and biology.
It cannot be the intent of an economist who is on his way to understand how
the economy works to get lost in these domains. Insofar, the reduction to homo
oeconomicus is justified. What is more, the prospects of rendering economics more
realistic by making homo oeconomicus more realistic are rather unpromising.
The human or personal factor will remain the irrational element in most,
or all, institutional social theories. (Popper, 1960, p. 157), original
emphasis
The quest for the laws of human behavior begins and ends either with a diffuse
psychological account that is hardly ever distinguishable from a projection or with
a patently weird idealization. Therefore it was, in the first place, not such a good
idea to put theoretical economics on so weak a foundation.
The abstract idea of wealth or value in exchange . . . must be carefully
distinguished from accessory ideas of utility, scarcity and suitability to
the needs and enjoyment of mankind .... These ideas are variable, and
by nature indeterminate and consequently ill suited for the foundation
of a scientific theory .... (Cournot, quoted in Mirowski, 1995, p. 208)
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Let us call this Cournot’s Unfitness Proposition. It asserts that behavioral assump-
tions are incapable of supporting a sophisticated theoretical superstructure that
corresponds reasonably well with real world phenomena.2 And from this follows
for the route to be taken:
The purpose . . . is to criticise the notion that economics is a science of
behaviour or that a science of behaviour is fundamental to economics.
This plausible and, as I believe, mistaken idea has sometimes been
called (methodological) psychologism, . . . . In opposition to psycholo-
gism I put forward the notion of economics as a study of spontaneous
order independent of any behavioural science. . . . If it is correct, then
all the attempts to derive an adequate model of economic behaviour
(as practised, for example, by the representatives of ‘behavioural’ or
‘psychological economics’) are misconceived. (Hudík, 2011, p. 147)
The critics of the neoclassical approach correctly spotted that the whole edifice rests
on a set of behavioral axioms. Yet with the attempt to make the formal representation
of choice more realistic the critics actually confirm its implicit assumption which
reads: in order to explain the economy it is necessary to explain human behavior
first.
If we ask, ‘What is the most adequate model of behaviour for eco-
nomics?’ we implicitly assume that economics actually needs a model
of behaviour; hence, we already assume psychologism of a kind.
(Hudík, 2011, p. 147)
Therefore, one has to go one step further and to move human behavior from the
center of the domain to the periphery. Put simply, it is advisable to change the
definition
Economics is the science which studies human behavior as a rela-
tionship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses.
(Robbins, 1935, p. 16)
to
Economics is the science which studies how the economic system
works.
What is demanded, then, is the reconstruction of a coherent theoretical superstructure
on a nonbehavioral foundation. This, of course, is not an entirely novel idea.
2 Some classics grasped this intuitively: “Macaulay pointed out that asserting restrictive, unrealistic
assumptions about human nature and then deducing the whole science of politics was ridiculous.”
(Redman, 1997, p. 322). See also (Hudson, 2010, pp. 14-16). Modern physicists are perfectly aware
of the decisive methodological point: “By having a vague theory it is possible to get either result. . . .
It is usually said when this is pointed out, ‘When you are dealing with psychological matters things
can’t be defined so precisely’. Yes, but then you cannot claim to know anything about it.” (Feynman,
1992, p. 159)
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The highest ambition an economist can entertain who believes in the
scientific character of economics would be fulfilled as soon as he
succeeded in constructing a simple model displaying all the essential
features of the economic process by means of a reasonably small
number of equations connecting a reasonably small number of variables.
Work on this line is laying the foundations of the economics of the
future . . . (Schumpeter, 1946, p. 3)
The mathematical method as such is not the cause of the ongoing economic crisis.
This is not to say that the method has been applied correctly. Thus far the heterodox
critique is justified. Yet:
. . . it is important to understand that what is put in question by re-
cent destructive results is not formalization in general but rather the
particular formalization generally employed in economic theory. That
a paradigm should be shown to be deficient does not imply that one
should cease to search for a paradigm. (Kirman, 1997, p. 97)
Neither common sense nor plain realism nor psychologism is a promising replace-
ment. As it stands at the moment, heterodox methodology is part of the malaise
rather than part of the solution.
8 Conclusion
The main result from the appraisal of economic methodology has been that be-
havioral assumptions, rational or otherwise, are not solid enough to be eligible
as first principles of theoretical economics. Hence all – orthodox and heterodox –
endeavors to lay the formal foundation on a new site and at a deeper level need no
further vindication.
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